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ABSTRACT
This article re-conceptualizes Europeanization with a development theory based approach to assess 
changes in Lithuania after the country’s 2004 European Union (EU) accession. The authors use the 
development theory of Douglass North, John Wallis, and Barry Weingast as a conceptual framework to 
highlight the role of Lithuania’s elite and to examine broader social transformations.  This developmental 
framework focuses and complements the current theory of Europeanization and emphasizes the positive 
role of the EU in promoting Lithuania’s long-term structural changes. A developmental approach also 
allows for an analysis of corruption and state capture, which are becoming important yardsticks for 
assessing change in Central and Eastern Europe. The results of this application (including a survey of the 
elite) demonstrate that, in Lithuania, change was more limited after joining the EU than during the 
pre-accession years and that the country’s domestic actors have been slow to replace the EU’s policy agenda 
with their own initiatives.
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INTRODUCTION
The aim of this article is to elaborate the Europeanization approach with development theory 
and to empirically test this approach by assessing the Europeanization of a member state that 
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joined the EU in 2004, Lithuania. This article starts with conceptual support for complementing 
Europeanization approach with additional models to better account for domestic change. 
Recent attempts to analyse Europeanization (Featherstone and Papadimitiriou, 2008; Bohle 
and Greskovits, 20122; Epstein and Jacoby, 2014), employ insights, citations, and approaches 
from the broader political economic literature—such as types of capitalism, and Polanyi’s 
approach to political and economic development. This article goes further down this road 
by placing Europeanization in the wider context of development studies to ask how the EU 
contributes—if at all—to broad political, economic, social and institutional change. 
One recent notable theory of development, published by Douglass C. North, John Joseph 
Wallis and Barry R. Weingast (North, et al., 2009), serves as our theoretical framework. In 
this theory, long-term change is based on a given society’s de-patrimonialization as it moves 
from the so-called natural state (characterized by the use of rents) into an open-access 
regime characterized by universal rights, market competition, easily accessed public goods, 
and a dense organization network. We claim that this theory provides an awaited opening of 
Europeanization theory that can also organize related empirical research.3
Empirically, we tested this approach in Lithuania—a one-country case of post-EU 
accession development. We started by assessing the level and direction of change in Lithuania 
after joining the EU. We used a number of comparative synthetic and statistical indicators 
to demonstrate trajectories of change. This testing also operationalized the developmental 
approach, particularly the North et al. approach, to Europeanization.
1. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: EUROPEANIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT
The recent tenth anniversary of EU accession, celebrated by the member states that joined 
the EU in 2004, provided an occasion to assess the actual impact of EU membership over 
the last ten years and to compare this impact with the new member states’ membership 
expectations. Domestic change, which could be attributed to the EU, is particularly interesting 
in the context of pre-accession change. It is important to note that the EU pressured these 
countries to adopt the political, economic, and legal changes embodied in the Copenhagen 
criteria. Many claimed this had a transformative effect on the new member states (Grabbe, 
2006). Has there been a transformative change in these countries? If yes, have these changes 
endured? Has a comparable degree of change occurred post-accession?
The ten-year jubilee prompted the publication of numerous studies regarding the post-
accession Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe. What were the conclusions of 
this research? Could they be compared to the conclusions of other Europeanization studies, 
especially in Southern Europe?
Many Europeanizationists are increasingly critical of the explanatory power of the 
Europeanization approach (Graziano and Vink, 2013). Moreover, this approach does not deal 
2  The latter is really about the comparative political economics of transition, but it provides a specific account 
on Europeanization.
3  This approach is quite similar to an approach of political development adopted in two recent volumes of 
Fukuyama (2011, 2014) as well.
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with domestic determinants of change, which are increasingly important in the post-accession 
context. There were attempts to complement Europeanization with broader theories such 
as: political economy in general, and types of capitalisms in particular (Featherstone and 
Papadimitriou, 2008); economic and historical theories, and long-term political economic 
approaches to the region’s development (Bohle and Greskovits, 2012; Epstein and Jacoby, 
2014); and political development and party politics approaches, including notions of state 
capture (Gzymala-Busse, 2007; Innes, 2014). Complementing Europeanization with wider-
reaching concepts seems to be a correct approach and this paper will explore and apply 
further extensions of the Europeanization approach to post-accession Lithuania.
A developmental perspective also enables wider geographical comparisons, making the 
concept of progress more relative. This is particularly important with respect to Europeanization 
in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) as recent literature (Epstein and Jacoby, 2014; Mueller, 
2014) tends to see the progress of these countries as mixed at best, especially in terms of their 
political developments. In literature on CEE, the concept of state capture becomes recurrent 
(Innes, 2014) and corruption is recognized as an eminent problem throughout the region 
(Mungiu-Pippidi, 2013). 
The fiscal and competitiveness crisis in southern EU member states revealed striking 
similarities between Central and Southern Europe,4 which suggests Europeanization’s 
limitations and makes questions about the EU and development even more pressing. Greece’s 
fiscal crisis, in particular, demonstrates the persistence of domestic political arrangements—a 
persistence that has rendered the effects of EU membership, and of structural funds, shallow. 
Tenacious corruption, clientelism, and low levels of social capital (as reflected in the low 
level of trust towards public institutions) are long-term trends—indicative of enduring social 
and political structures—that the EU seems unable to reverse. However, conceptualizing this 
inability is hardly possible given the limited toolbox of the current Europeanization literature, 
which offers mostly short-term, EU-centred approaches. 
A transitology approach based on the perspective of political economy offers a more 
promising perspective. A study by Bohle and Greskovits (2012) is a good example of a recent 
attempt to place Europeanization in the broader context of transition in Central and Eastern 
Europe5. 
2. THE NORTH, WALLIS, AND WEINGAST APPROACH, DEVELOPMENT,  
AND EUROPEANIZATION
The recently published North et al. approach to development combines insights from a broad 
range of social sciences. This approach distinguishes two societal models: natural order 
and open-access order societies. In the North et al. approach, the elites’ ability to extract 
rents from members of a given society in exchange for protection from violence drives and 
4  This is particularly evident when comparing such structural features as the level (or rather lack) of social 
capital in these countries. See Lyberaki and Paraskevolous, 2002; Sotiroupulos, 2011.
5  Note that it is limited to the current members of the EU. Reflection on the developments further East in 
the post-Soviet countries could have provided a good counterfactual.
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shapes societal organization. Furthermore, North et. al hold that controlling violence is the 
fundamental function and organizing principle of all organizations. Patrimonial relationships 
characterized by elite privilege and a regime’s reliance on private goods are linked organizing 
principles.
Open order develops when a credible force threatens to share the ruling elites’ spoils. This 
order emerges as the regime gradually universalizes privileges into rights. The establishment 
of the rule of law—important to the accumulation of wealth—accompanies a second 
transition towards open order. The gradual move from an economy organized by monopolies 
to one organized by market competition occurs with the institutionalization of property 
rights. Finally, productivity and the accumulation of wealth accelerate rapidly as private good 
gradually become public goods, including roads, education, and social welfare.
Crucial to this transition from a natural to an open-access order is the de-personalization of 
social bonds.  Making social bonds independent of blood relations allows for the transformation 
of: 1) elite privileges into universal rights, 2) monopoly dominated economies into competitive 
markets and 3) private goods to public goods. The number, nature, and lifespan of organizations 
is an observable accompanying trend indicating the de-personalization of social bonds and 
the movement from kin-based to merit-based relationships. This de-personalization of social 
bonds is also cited as a fundamental shift in the political development by other eminent 
political theorists, such as Fukuyama.6 
3. OPERATIONALIZATION THROUGH ELITES, STATE CAPTURE, AND DEVELOPMENT
It is quite obvious that Europeanization is closely related to three dimensions of transition. 
During and after new member states’ pre-accession period, the EU encouraged the rule of 
law and non-discrimination, emphasized market competition protections, and encouraged 
widening the use and accessibility of a larger and improved pool of public goods. However, the 
transitions emphasized differed in the pre-and post-accession periods. Before new member 
state’s 2004 EU accession, two transitions—to the rule of law and to increased market 
competition, embodied by the Copenhagen criteria—dominated the candidate countries’ 
agenda. After the accession, the EU’s structural funds emerged as the factor that shifted the 
agenda towards expanding and enhancing public goods and economic infrastructure. 
Elites, state capture, and development seem to be the three dimensions missing from 
the Europeanization approach.  Integrating these dimensions makes the Europeanization 
approach more relevant and responsive to the trends of social change in the region. 
Why should analysts integrate the role of elites into the Europeanization approach? The 
development and transition literature tends to emphasize the role of elites in inducing and 
managing social change. The role of elites, particularly that of administrative elites, tends 
to grow during times of social reform, such as during states’ EU pre-accession period.7 The 
changing role of elites is a dominant feature of the North et al. approach. Has there been a 
6  See his theory of political development in Fukuyama, 2011 and 2014.
7  See Lippert, Umbach and Wessels, 2001 on the role of the so-called core executives during EU-accession 
negotiations. The role of core-executives was explored in the case of Lithuania by Maniokas, Vilpišauskas and 
Žeruolis, 2005.
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considerable change in the role of elites in CEE—and in Lithuania in particular? Are the elites 
in these countries different from their counterparts in other EU member states? The recent 
EU-wide comparative project on elites, IntUne has discovered that in terms of European 
elites’ attitudes towards the EU, elites in Lithuania, and the region in particular, are not very 
different from their counterparts in other EU member states. In this respect, there is also no 
significant difference between the attitudes of the elites and the general public. However, 
these differences widen when attitudes towards the core issues of a democracy and the 
market economy are concerned (Steen, 2012). They show the lack of political and institutional 
consolidation. 
The latest Lithuanian survey of the country’s elite8 confirmed marked differences in 
opinion between the elite and the elite and the general public. Namely, the most evident gaps 
between these two groups are in their opinions about how well their democracy is functioning. 
They also differed in their confidence in others and in their trust in institutions. In 2014, 64 
per cent of Lithuanian elites were satisfied with the democracy in the country, however only 
39 per cent (Baltijos tyrimai, 2014) of the general public agreed with them— 50 per cent of 
the general public was dissatisfied with their democracy’s functioning. The other important 
distinction revealed by the survey were the two groups’ differing levels of confidence in other 
people. Whereas 82 per cent of the Lithuanian elite agreed that it is reasonable to trust the 
majority of other people, 72 per cent (Social Information Centre and ESTEP Vilnius, 2014) of 
the Lithuanian general public stated the opposite, that it is better to be cautious when dealing 
with others. The level of trust in institutions also varies greatly between these two groups 
(see Figure 1). Only the presidential institution received more positive attitudes than negative 
attitudes overall from the Lithuanian general public.
8  The survey was conducted in May-June 2014 as a part of the project mentioned above, Lithuania in the EU: 
transformation or imitation? The sample of the survey was 74 persons out of which 54 were members of the 
Lithuanian Parliament (2012–2016 term) and 20 – other non-elected elite members. Empirical findings in this 
article draw heavily on this survey.
FIGURE 1: Per cent of Lithuanian elites and per cent of the general public in Lithuania who trust 
Lithuanian institutions 
Source: Elite survey, 2014 and Vilmorus January 2015 population survey data.
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Why should analysts integrate state capture into a Europeanization approach? State 
capture and corruption are increasingly associated with the development of Central and 
Eastern Europe after the region’s countries joined the EU (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2013; Innes, 
2014; Mueller, 2014). The state capture and corruption dimensions can contribute to and 
operationalize the North et al. theory. Although the concept of state capture is not yet 
widely used in Europeanization literature, its application is relevant—state capture affects 
perceptions of the benefits and costs of Europeanization after accession. 
Why should analysts integrate development into a Europeanization approach? 
Development literature provides post-accession change with both an extended temporal and 
a wider theoretical context. And, most importantly, development serves as a yardstick for 
measuring the relative value of Europeanization, as both the EU and the changes countries 
undergo upon joining the EU are put in the context of broader development goals. In this sense, 
the relationship between notions of Europeanization and development can be paralleled with 
a relationship between means and ends. While Europeanization can be perceived as a goal in 
itself, it rests on the assumption that it is closely related to and is a way towards development.
3 . 1 .  Te s t i n g  G r o u n d :  Lo g i c  a n d  R e s u l t s  o f  C h a n g e  A f t e r  Acce s s i o n 
Most of the Europeanization literature dealing with the pre-accession period in CEE countries 
focused on the issue of the logic of change and concluded that it was consequential: EU 
membership related incentives played a major role in bringing economic, political, regulatory 
and institutional change (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005). It was also argued that 
this change was transformational (Grabbe, 2006).9 However, there were few attempts to 
conceptualize a pattern of dominant change. Recently the change was reflected again in 
studies of Europeanization beyond the EU (Schimmelffennig, 2012) and explorations of the 
EU’s projected values. Analysts concluded that the EU is promoting a self-image of good 
governance characterized by regionalism, liberal democratic values, and a (highly-regulated) 
neoliberal economic market.10 
An increasing number of revisionists are questioning the success of Europeanization in 
CEE—a region that stands in sharp contrast with the Western Balkans and the European 
Union’s Eastern neighbourhood,11 as both are regarded as Europeanization failures. These 
authors use a wide range of reform indicators to demonstrate the real progress of countries in 
the CEE during the post-accession years (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2008; Börzel and Van Hüllen, 2011; 
Börzel, 2012). The limited change is particularly evident in the area of quality of democracy. It 
seems that the quality of these countries’ democracies has hardly improved during the post-
accession years (Börzel and Van Hüllen, 2011); the main transformations happened in the 
9  Other literature provides a more nuanced picture. Most of the cases could cluster better around a partial 
adaption. The ousting of Meciar government in Slovakia remains probably the only case, which can be unequivo-
cally qualified as a transformational impact of the EU.
10  There might be an argument regarding whether this image is the same inside the EU. Most of the markets 
of the EU member states are quite different from the images projected outside.
11  The European Union’s Eastern neighbourhood is defined by the Eastern partnership programme and consists 
of Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia and Belarus. 
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early years of these countries’ post-communist transitions. Therefore, the EU’s power might 
be less ‘transformative’ than suggested earlier.
Regarding countries’ pre-accession periods, the impact of the EU was particularly 
visible in Central and Eastern Europe: the EU gave these former candidate countries a very 
concentrated push, which their relatively weak domestic institutions hardly resisted. The 
EU has been conceptualized as a regulatory state12 and its impact has been conceptualized 
as a non-majoritarian transformation of governance (Maniokas 2008). Analysts refer to a 
non-majoritarian revolution to describe the diminishing role of elected bodies and officials, 
such as national parliaments, and the growing clout of semi-autonomous agencies, such 
as regulators and inspectors in CEE new member states.13 Moreover, the EU also helped to 
make these countries’ public administrations and courts more autonomous. It was argued 
(Maniokas, 2003) that the de-politization of public policy trend helped to prevent CEE states 
from experiencing the state captures occurring further east, in the countries of former Soviet 
Union.
3 . 2 .  M a i n  Tr e n d s  i n  L i t h u a n i a  A f t e r  E U  Ac ce s s i o n :   L i m i t e d  C h a n g e
In Lithuania, after accession, most relevant indicators demonstrate a rather limited change in 
Lithuania during the last eight years, with the exceptions of achieving economic convergence, 
improving healthy life expectancy, and increasing education attainment (see Table 1 for 
relevant data).
Most of the indicators provided above on the quality of democracy, governance 
effectiveness, and corruption have remained quite stable during Lithuania’s EU membership. 
There were, however, some variations to this trend, including: a marked opening of the 
economy (reflected in the index of globalization), a considerable increase in tertiary education 
attainment, and a sizeable improvement in e-governance indicators. There were also two 
changes in the core indicators. The first change is the level of (nominal) economic convergence; 
Lithuania progressed from 52 in 2004 to 74 per cent of GDP in 2012. 
Economic convergence was achieved despite the economic crisis. Lithuania’s case 
confirms that though the EU contributed to its economic boom and property bubble, the EU 
also softened the impact of the economic crisis (Epstein and Jacoby 2014). In Lithuania, the 
GDP per capita in purchasing power standards during the EU membership period increased by 
22 points and peaked at 74 in 2013 (see Figure 2). 
Part of this convergence, however, is due to a statistical effect (there was a higher EU 
average in 2004, before the accession of Romania and Bulgaria and a drop in the GDP in 
Southern Europe) and due to considerable emigration from Lithuania. Since 2004, the official 
number of Lithuanian emigrants has climbed to more than 440,000—nearly 13 per cent of 
Lithuania’s population in 2004 (see Figure 3). 
12  Regulatory state describes public policy change from direct intervention in the economy towards the es-
tablishment of rules and their supervision.
13  See Vibert, 2007 for a review and analysis of the rise of the unelected as a global trend. This trend is featured 
in many current debates about democracy, including an essay in The Economist on March 1, 2014. 
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TABLE 1: Indices and indicators of Lithuania in 2004 and 201314
INDICATORS
VALUE
2004 2013
Bertelsmann Index15
9.02 (7/119) 
2006 
8.98 (7/129) 
2014
Happiness Index16
UN World Happiness Report
5.8
5.4 (71/156)
2012
Democracy Index17
Economist Intelligence Unit
7.43 (39/167) 
2006 
7.24 (42/167)
2012
Sustainable Society Index18 
Sustainable Society Foundation
5.8 (7/EU-27) 
2006 
6.3 (8/EU-27)
2014
Global Competiveness Index19
Global Competiveness Report
4.49 (39/122) 
2006 
4.41 (48/144) 
2014
Globalization Index20
KOF Globalization Index
64.94 (46/187)
72.27 (34/187)
2014
SMART SOCIETY
VALUE
2004 2013
Bertelsmann Democracy Index
9.25 (8/119)
2006 
9.25 (8/129) 
2014
Tertiary education attainment among 30-34 year olds
Eurostat
31.1 (11/EU-27) 51.3 (3/EU-27)
Life-long learning among 25-64 year olds, %
Eurostat
5.9 (16/EU-27) 5.7 (21/EU-27)
Civic Empowerment Index21
Civil Society Institute
33.9 
2007 
36
Income quintile share ratio (S80/S20)
Eurostat
6.9 (26/EU-27) 
2005 
6.1 (22/EU-27)
Healthy life years
Eurostat
54.6 (23/EU-27) 
2005 (female)
51.4 (25/EU-27)
2005 (male)
61.6 (15/EU-27) 
(female)
56.6 (23/EU-27)
(male)
Life expectancy
Eurostat
77.7 (23/EU-27)
(female)
66.2 (26/EU-27)
(male)
79.6 (23/EU-27)
(female)
68.4 (27/EU-27)
2012 (male)
14  If available, authors used 2014 data.
15  Methodology <http://www.bti-project.org/index/methodology/>. 
16  Methodology <http://unsdsn.org/resources/publications/world-happiness-report-2013/>.
17  Methodology <http://pages.eiu.com/rs/eiu2/images/Democracy-Index-2012.pdf>.
18  Methodology <http://www.ssfindex.com/ssi/calculation-methodology/>.
19  Methodology <http://www.weforum.org/reports/global-competitiveness-report-2013-2014>. 
20  Methodology <http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/media/filer_public/2013/03/25/method_2013.pdf>. 
21  Methodology <http://www.civitas.lt/lt/?pid=74&id=78>.
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SMART ECONOMY
VALUE
2004 2013
Bertelsmann Market Economy Status
8.79 (9/119)
2006 
8.71 (8/129) 
2014
Summary Innovation Index22
Innovation Union Scoreboard
0.24 (25/EU-27) 
2008 
0.289 (23/EU-27)
Ease of Doing Business Rank23
Doing Business
6th place in the EU 
2006 
6th place in the EU 
GDP per capita in Purchasing Power Standard
Eurostat
52 (23/EU-27) 74 (21/EU-27)
Foreign direct investment (GDP %)24 
Eurostat
2.3 (18/EU-27) 1.2 (16/EU-27) 
Research and development expenditure (GDP %) 
Eurostat
0.75 (18/EU-27) 0.95 (19/EU-27)
University-industry collaboration
Global Competiveness Report
53/134 
2008 
4.6 (28/148)
SMART GOVERNANCE
VALUE
2004 2013
Bertelsmann Management Index
7.15 (9/119) 
2006 
7.08 (8/129)
2014
Bertelsmann Management Performance Index
8.54 (10/119)
2006 
8.67 (6/129)
2014
Government Effectiveness25
Worldwide Governance Indicators
0.75 (76/215) 0.82 (56/210)
Regulatory Quality26
Worldwide Governance Indicators
1.14 (82/230) 1.13 (34/210)
Trust in state and municipalities institutions, %
Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Lithuania
48
2006 
41
E-government development27
UN e-Government Development Database
0.53 (43/193)
0.73 (29/193)
2014
Corruption Perceptions Index28
Transparency International 
4.6 (44/145) 57 (43/175. 17/EU-27) 
Source: compiled by the authors.
22  Methodology <http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/innovation/files/ius/ius-2014_en.pdf>.
23  Methodology <http://www.doingbusiness.org/methodology>. 
24  Methodology <http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/web/table/description.jsp>.
25  Methodology <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc>.
26  Methodology <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc>.
27  Methodology <http://unpan3.un.org/egovkb/Portals/egovkb/Documents/un/2014-Survey/E-Gov_Comple-
te_Survey-2014.pdf>. 
28  Methodology <http://www.transparency.org/files/content/pressrelease/2013_CPISourceDescription_
EN.pdf>. 
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FIGURE 2: GDP per capita in purchasing power standard in Lithuania from 2004 to 2013
Source: compiled by the authors from Eurostat data.
FIGURE 3: Lithuanian emigration from 2004 to 2013
Source: Statistics Lithuania.
29  However, its quality is rather poor by most of the assessments.
Another significant change, an increase in average healthy life expectancy, is significant only 
among women in Lithuania, for whom healthy life years increased from 55 in 2005 and reached 
the EU average, 62, in 2012. Meanwhile the average healthy life expectancy of Lithuanian men 
remained below-average and was among the EU’s lowest during the 2005 to 2012 period.
Lithuania is a leader in education in the EU; nearly half of 30-34 year-old Lithuanians have 
tertiary education.29 In 2012, 93 per cent of 20- to 64-year-old Lithuanians had completed at 
least a secondary education (EU average was 74 per cent). 
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3 . 3 .  R u l e  o f  L a w,  C o m p e t i t i o n ,  a n d  O r g a n i z a t i o n  D e n s i t y
The theory offered by North et al. directly focuses on the rule of law, market competition, and 
the quantity and quality of organizations. Thorough assessments of these dimensions are well 
beyond the remit of this article, but some initial considerations of these three dimensions are 
provided below.
The rule of law is particularly important in the North et al. approach as the establishment 
of the rule of law is the best proxy of a state’s transition to an open-access regime. In Lithuania, 
the development of the rule of law was closely connected with the country’s accession to the 
EU. As an established rule of law was one of EU’s membership conditions (part of the so-called 
Copenhagen criteria), Lithuania’s judicial and legal sector had already underwent profound 
changes before Lithuania accepted EU membership in 2004. Thus in in terms of the North et 
al. theory, Lithuania transformed itself by establishing the rule of law before 2004. The most 
significant of these changes enacted before 2004 occurred in the judiciary sector—at that time, 
the European Commission was still concerned about the professional competence of judges and 
prosecutors, the length of court proceedings, and the enforcement of verdicts (Infolex, 2003).
Lithuania’s establishment of the rule of law is illustrated by Worldwide Governance 
Indicators data. According to this data, the rule of law in Lithuania has been increasing since 
1996: from 0.36 points in 1996 to 0.79 in 2013 (see Figure 4). The most evident jump occurred 
during Lithuania’s EU membership preparation period, between 2000 and 2004. 
On the other hand, though Lithuania improved its rule of law scores, Lithuanians’ 
perceptions of the rule of law have not correspondingly improved. Lithuanians’ level of trust 
in their national legal system is among the lowest in the EU (see Table 2). This low level of trust 
correlates with the aforementioned sense of widespread corruption and contributes to a lack 
of trust in the state in general and low satisfaction with the democratic system.
FIGURE 4: Assessment of the rule of law in Lithuania from 1996 to 2013
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators data.
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Moreover, in 2012, 56 per cent of people did not agree with the statement that Lithuania’s 
legal system was functioning independent of undue influence from politicians and interest 
groups (Gaidys 2013, p. 29). On the other hand, the implementation of the rule of law was 
perceived more favourably – 42 per cent of Lithuanian respondents agreed that the principle 
works (36 per cent did not agree). Current research (Dobryninas, 2012; Valickas, 2013) on 
trust in the Lithuanian courts is inconclusive: it is not clear, for example, whether the attitudes 
of respondents with direct experience in court proceedings are related to their assessment 
of judiciary performance. However, the latest findings of the EU Justice Scoreboard show that 
public opinion regarding the rule of law is not related to the actual delivery of judicial services. 
Lithuania is one of the top countries in the EU measured by such indicators as the speed and 
rate of case resolution, and the number of pending cases (European Commission, 2013a). 
Therefore, according to North et al. approach, it could be argued that although the rule of 
law exists in Lithuania and its quality is incrementally improving, general social attitudes about 
the rule of law’s functioning are not too optimistic. 
Monopolies and market competition, before and after accession, are yet another 
important aspect of the transition to an open-access order regime as conceptualized by North 
et al. However, it is difficult to compare different market sectors or draw general conclusions 
about market competition in general. Moreover, Lithuania’s economy, due to the country’s 
small size, has a small number of consumers and has oligopolies in several market sectors 
(Stanikūnas, 2009). Because of this, even the current picture of competition in Lithuania 
(and other countries) greatly varies between market sectors. The current situation in the 
telecommunications market serves as an example of these variations. Although Lithuania’s 
fixed-line telephone market is monopolized (by Teo), Lithuania’s mobile communication 
market is the most competitive in the EU. The latest calculations of the European Commission 
revealed that there is a 774 per cent difference between the cheapest and most expensive 
mobile phone call prices across the EU. Lithuanians pay the least for mobile services (European 
Commission 2013b) (see Figure 5), indicating a high level of competition in the market. Because 
of liberal legal regulation of the Lithuanian mobile market, licenses are cheap. The Lithuanian 
TABLE 2: Trust in the national legal system in 2004, 2007 and 2013, in per cent of those trusting
 2004 2007 2010 2013 Average
Denmark 79 85 84 85 83
Finland 73 77 77 85 78
EU-27 45 47 47 53 48
Romania 26 26 23 25 30
Slovakia 28 25 22 31 28
Lithuania 28 25 22 24 27
Slovenia 27 26 22 24 25
Bulgaria 20 12 16 35 21
Source: Eurobarometer.
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Communications Regulatory Authority had already promoted inexpensive mobile services in 
2004. However, some fear that competition in this market sector has gone too far and will be 
detrimental to long-term investments in the market’s new generation of infrastructure and 
technological upgrades (Degutis, 2013).
Again, for the reasons mentioned above, comparing or quantitatively measuring market 
competition is complex. There is no international comparative research regarding market 
competition in the EU or in the wider region. 
Perceptions of market competition by country should also be taken into account. A recent 
Eurobarometer survey on competition policies in the EU demonstrated that most EU citizens 
experienced a problem resulting from a lack of market competition. Overall, within the EU, 
the energy sector was most commonly cited as a sector that lacked market competition 
(Eurobarometer 403). In responding to queries about markets lacking competition in their 
own country, Lithuanians first named the food supply sector (25 per cent) and then the 
energy sector (24 per cent). According to the survey, Lithuanians attributed the lack of market 
competition in Lithuania to high prices (62 per cent)—although, in fact, high prices are a result 
of ineffective competition. However, experts note that in Lithuania, competition in any market 
sector is not dependent on the number of players in a given market, but on their will to 
compete.30 Thus, a market consisting of only of a few players could be also highly competitive. 
To evaluate the Lithuanian economy’s shift from state-owned monopolies during its early 
period of independence in the 1990s to the current situation in the market, we used qualitative 
assessments. Experts confirmed, that the general economic trend in Lithuania—a movement 
towards market competition—is without a doubt, positive.31 The necessity to comply with 
EU regulations during the pre-accession stage forced Lithuania to withdraw tax exemptions 
and privileged treatment from some market players (in the telecommunications, alcohol, and 
FIGURE 5: Average cost per minute in mobile communications in 2011, EUR cents
Source: European Commission.
30  Interview with Rimantas Stanikūnas, Chairman of the Lithuanian Competition Council from 1999 to 2009.
31  Interview with Rimantas Stanikūnas.
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waste sectors). The Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index of the last 10 years confirms 
that Lithuania’s economic shifts have been successful, both market-based competition and 
anti-monopoly policy indicators in Lithuania were evaluated with the highest marks, 9 and 10 
respectively.
In the North et al. framework, organization density is the third element in the transition 
to an open-access regime. Considering transformations in organization density is reasonable, 
civil society forms the basis of a functioning democracy. Robert Putnam also highlighted 
the importance of voluntary organizations and social capital in this regard (Putnam, 1993; 
2000). According to Putnam, civil society organizations (CSO) promote solidarity internally 
and are vitally significant, externally, to interest articulation. It is clear that the number of 
organizations in Lithuania has significantly increased, in both the private and NGO sectors (see 
Figure 6) since independence and over the last ten years.32 Yet, despite this growth, only 50 
per cent of Lithuania’s registered NGOs are functioning NGOs (Žiliukaitė, 2012; USAID, 2013). 
However, the number of CSOs and the density of the CSO networks alone do not 
indicate a state’s transition to an open-order regime. Functioning democratic institutions 
are also premised on engagement in the CSO network (indirectly through social capital). 
This engagement aspect is important to an analysis of organization density transitions in 
Lithuanian. The number of Lithuanian citizens who participate in CSO activities remained 
small (Žiliukaitė, 2012). While 22 per cent of Lithuanians were actively involved in public 
organizations in 1990, Lithuanians’ CSO engagement was 14 per cent in both 1999 and 2008 
(European Value Studies data). Recent studies show a further decline: CSO participation, 
according to the Civic Empowerment Index, reached only 12 per cent in 2012 (Pilietinės 
32  Because of the lack of accurate information, we presented statistics only for the last ten years. According to 
the Centre of Registers, in 1994 there were 1302 registered organizations, and in 2011, 22246. However, because 
of the complicated legal definition, the exact number of Lithuanian NGOs was never known. Each year around 
1000 new CSOs register in Lithuania (USAID, 2013).
FIGURE 6: Number of organizations in Lithuania from 2004 to 2014
Source: Statistics Lithuania.
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visuomenės institutas, 2013). These numbers correlate with poor civic empowerment in 
general— the Civic Empowerment Index’s calculations of Lithuanian civic engagement33 have 
not changed significantly from 33.9 points in 2007 to 35 in 2012.34 
These low levels of CSO involvement are due to a combination of factors.  While Lithuanians 
appear to lack the time for, interest in, and access to relevant networks, Lithuania’s low 
level of CSO engagement could be also attributed to the country’s recent history. During 
the decades of Soviet rule, there were negative attitudes towards public organizations and 
a general culture of distrust. Finally, NGO’s ineffective efforts to attract new members, low 
public visibility, limited financial capacities, and finite human resources also contributed to 
Lithuanians’ low CSO engagement levels (Žiliukaitė, 2012). 
According to the USAID’s CSO Sustainability Index—which measures legal environment, 
organizational capacity, financial viability, advocacy, service provision, infrastructure, and 
public image—Lithuania’s CSO functioning was increasing from 1997 to 2001, but has 
remained stable over the last 10 years (see Figure 7). However, compared to other CEE 
countries, Lithuania does not show very well. In 2013, Lithuania (with an overall score of 2.7) 
fell behind Estonia (2.0), Poland (2.2), the Czech Republic (2.6) and Latvia (2.6). Lithuania’s CSO 
environment was evaluated best in the dimensions of advocacy (2.0) and legal environment 
(2.1) and worst in service provision (3.4) and financial viability (3.2). 
To summarize the assessment of the North et al. dimension of organization density in 
Lithuania, there is a significant increase in the number of CSOs in Lithuania since the beginning 
33  More about Civic Empowerment Index see Pilietinės visuomenės institutas, <http://www.kuriamerespublika.
lt/naujienos/85>.
34  Out of 100 points.
FIGURE 7: CSO sustainability index in Lithuania from 1997 to 2013*
Source: US Agency for International Development.
*Score A score of one indicates a very advanced civil society sector with a high level of sustain-
ability, and a score of seven indicates a fragile, unsustainable sector with a low level of develop-
ment.
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of the country’s early independence period, more than 20 years ago. However, Lithuanians’ 
low engagement in CSOs reveals a lack of trust in others, distrust of institutions, poor social 
capital, and a lack of lasting organizational traditions, all of which contribute to suspicions 
about CSO participation in general.
3 . 4 .  Pu b l i c  G o o d s,  S e r v i c e s,  a n d  E u r o p e a n i z a t i o n
As mentioned in the description of the North et al. approach above, an important step in a 
state’s transition from a closed to an open-access order, is the shift from private to public 
goods. This is also a substantial dimension of Europeanization and relates directly to the 
impact of the EU’s structural funds.
The main instrument of the EU’s impact on Lithuania (and other new member states) 
changed in the post-accession period. While the EU’s single market and the consequential 
opportunities of open markets and foreign investments continued to be important factors 
(Epstein, 2014; Medve-Bálint, 2014), their transformative role and effect was more evident 
before Lithuania’s EU accession. After accession, structural funds emerged as a new factor and 
have significantly contributed to investments in public goods. 
The North et al. approach stresses the government’s growth through expenditures on 
and a wider provision of public goods during the state’s transition to an open-access regime, 
“Big government in open access orders is not an aberration but an integral feature of these 
societies,” (North et al., 2009, p. 122). A wider provision of public goods is part of the principal 
logic of universalization occurring through the mass citizenry. The extension of public goods 
delivered on an objective, impersonal basis could extend the scope of and help sustain open-
access regimes. These extensions also tend to increase productivity.35
What has the EU contributed to Lithuania in terms of the delivery of public goods 
before and, especially, after Lithuania’s EU accession? Undoubtedly, the EU has contributed 
significantly to Lithuania, particularly through the allocation of structural funds. The EU’s total 
financial support to Lithuania per capita per year has been increasing since 2004.36 
The provision of the EU’s structural funds considerably increased public and private 
investments in Lithuania and other CEE countries. From 2004 to 2012, the EU’s structural 
funding comprised 54 per cent of Lithuania’s total public capital expenditure.37 This figure 
rose to 80 per cent in the years following the global financial crisis.
Most structural funds were spent on public infrastructure, such as transportation (26.6 
per cent of all structural funds spending from 2007 to 2013), environmental services (mostly 
waste and water), and energy networks (particularly electric and heating, 24.9 per cent). A 
high proportion of structural funding went to research and development infrastructure, 23 per 
cent. Fifteen per cent of the funds were invested in so-called social infrastructure, including 
healthcare and social services. As a result, the main achievements of the EU’s funding are 
35  An alternative view would be to see a level of public investment as a proxy of the level of corruption (Mungiu-
Pippidi, 2013).
36  But in comparative prices it will drop in the new financial perspective.
37  Calculated on the basis of data from the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Lithuania.
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related to the creation or improvement of public infrastructures including: roads, railways, 
water and waste treatment facilities, electrical grids, heating networks, digital broadband 
networks, schools, hospitals, and social service institutions. Alongside investments in 
administrative capacity, this new infrastructure created the conditions for improved and more 
accessible public services.
There is a lack of data concerning the quality of public services in Lithuania. The available 
evaluations of specific services, however, indicate that the quality of public services is not high 
and has not changed considerably—regardless of the current EU structural investments and 
ongoing public service reforms.38 Cases studies performed as part of thematic evaluations of 
structural funding interventions39 indicated three factors, which might explain this puzzle. The 
first factor is systemic problems associated with a sub-optimal network of service providers. 
This is particularly relevant in the provision of social services. The second factor, quality issues 
caused by the poor use of infrastructure was related to service delivery and is due to deficits in 
client-need orientation, professional competence, and staff motivation, among other issues. 
Finally, the third factor is the low-awareness of and low-accessibility to some public services. 
Moreover, the newly built infrastructure requires maintenance, and this places pressure on 
public budgets. The infrastructure also has to be optimized to meet the demands of changing 
demographics.
Finally, in addition to changing new member state’s public policies and widening their 
governance, the most controversial impact of the structural funds was the creation of an 
additional motivation for state capture. The emergence of new types of political parties in 
Lithuania is closely related to this phenomenon. Though new populist parties began to emerge 
before the provision of structural funding and is a feature seen throughout the CEE region 
(Innes, 2014), structural funds increased the state’s available resources, thus motivating some 
of these parties to resemble business organizations with the sole aim of appropriating newly 
available resources40.
CONCLUSIONS
We have placed Europeanization in the context of a broad developmental theory (North, et al., 
2009) to see if a wider framework can compensate for the shortcomings of the Europeanization 
approach, particularly for this approach’s shortfalls in capturing the new member states’ post-
accession experiences—when the EU’s role in promoting change became less important. 
We tested this approach in Lithuania with a broad spectrum of development indicators. 
This proved useful. This developmental framework revealed an important EU contribution 
38  These evaluations can be accessed on the Ministry of Finance of Lithuania’s website at <http://www.espa-
rama.lt/vertinimo-ataskaitos>.
39  See in particular evaluations on investment in e-government services, education, and innovation.
40  The Labour Party in Lithuania could be an example of this kind of party behaviour similar to the behaviour 
documented in Innes, 2014 in the Czech Republic. The case of corruption against this party is currently in the 
Lithuanian courts, but it remains in the ruling coalition. Recent attempts of the same party to capture major 
structural funding management agencies are also widely reported in the Lithuanian media. There are also media 
reports on the involvement of other political parties in the micro-management of SF.
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to wider developmental goals, both in Lithuania’s pre-accession and post-accession phase, 
namely, to the country’s threefold transformation as it establishes a universal rule of law, 
de-monopolizes markets, and moves from private to public goods. The EU’s contribution to 
this process changed after Lithuania’s EU accession though. The emphases on establishing a 
universal rule of law and protecting market competition dominated during Lithuania’s pre-
accession period, but the EU has eased its pressure on new member states to changes in 
these areas. In the post-accession phase, structural funds contributed to a focus on the wider 
dissemination of public goods. 
The developmental approach’s emphasis on the role of elites, state capture, and broader 
societal transformations complements the current theory of Europeanization and better 
accounts for post-accession trajectories of change. It also provides a framework for analysing 
issues of corruption and state capture—which, once considered a deviation, are now regarded 
as norms in many eastern and southern European member states. 
The EU’s role during the pre-accession period in preventing state capture could be regarded 
as one of its most important impacts on Lithuania. We have registered more visible attempts 
to capture the Lithuanian state after accession. Structural funds provided an additional 
incentive for state capture by increasing the resources and size of the state. However, whether 
this incentive has become an entrenched element of the Lithuanian polity is questionable.
Applying a broad developmental framework also allowed for a more focused comparison of 
Lithuania’s post-accession and pre-accession trends. Available data on Lithuania demonstrated 
slower changes after the country’s EU accession. Though the Lithuanian economy continued 
to converge, despite the global economic crisis, there was almost no progress made towards 
improving the quality of democracy, widening governance, or in making gains in the other 
dimensions reviewed. But the marked declines assumed in many recent evaluations of the 
post-accession climate in Central and Eastern Europe did not occur in Lithuania.
The quality of life in Lithuania, as demonstrated by the increase in the average healthy 
life expectancy, is rising—an increase that can be associated with the EU and with structural 
assistance in particular. The measureable improvement to the quality of life in Lithuania, 
however, is hardly reflected in the public’s perception. While Lithuanians’ pessimistic public 
outlook might be an idiosyncratic trace of Lithuania’s history, it can also be due to high 
expectations and to the economic crisis in particular. 
Lithuania is continuing its transition to an open-access regime, though more slowly than 
expected.  This transition is far from being completed. The major gap between the Lithuanian 
elite and general public is in the perception of the rule of law. The weakness of the non-
governmental organizations continues to persist. The EU’s role in this transition was significant, 
but not conclusive. 
The developmental framework also revealed major structural weaknesses that were not 
captured by the classic Europeanization approach. It seems that Lithuania, like other central 
and southern European countries need further investment to increase social capital and build 
social confidence.
This framework also has several weaknesses, as was demonstrated by the empirical 
testing. It is difficult to operationalize the structural changes postulated in the theory. For 
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example, the concept of the rule of law is elusive, and indicators of efficiency, such as the 
number of backlogged court cases, can hardly be associated with perceptions of justice. There 
were also fundamental difficulties in assessing the level of competition in any given market 
and in measuring the viability of organizations and their density. Further research is necessary 
to both operationalize the main hypotheses and to link a change with public perceptions of 
that particular change.
Further development of interdisciplinary research on the trajectories of change suggested 
by North, Wallis, and Weingast—the rule of law, market competition, public goods, and 
development organizations—would contribute to a better understanding of deep social 
changes in the European periphery. Limited knowledge about these changes is clearly related 
not only to the shortcomings of the Europeanization approach, but to the characteristics and 
difficulties of the post-communist transitions in these countries.
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